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Abstract 
This paper describes an accident (explosion and natural gas fire) that occurred in Turin 
(Italy), in which power distribution cables,  tramway network feeding cables and a gas pipe 
were involved. 
The described accident is particularly interesting because it occurred in the town centre 
and lasted several hours, producing a very high risk for the population. Fortunately, 
nobody was injured, but 120 people were evacuated for 24 hours. The sequence of events 
is described, the involved facilities are examined and the physical processes which led to 
the different top events are discussed. Actually, starting from a modest event (600 V 
electric cable loss of insulation), which most likely lasted for months, the aforementioned 
accident was reached in a crescendo of domino effects. This sequence has been 
represented by an ISD in which the failure of the different protection systems is 
highlighted. These protection systems were mostly based upon the strict respect of 
procedures both in the installation and in the following maintenance of the different utilities. 
These aspects have been also briefly devised in the light of Italian and foreign regulations 
concerning the problem of the coexistence of buried utilities. 
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1. Introduction 
In towns, where population densities are high, gas, water and electric power distribution 
utility networks coexist and are often buried close together. Moreover, most urban utility 
networks are quite old and breakdowns are not unusual. Maintenance operations, which 
require removing the paving and digging trenches, constitute extraordinary stresses on the 
networks that are not involved in the maintenance itself, but located nearby. 
Because of the previously mentioned reasons, faults frequently occur and are likely to 
spread to the closest networks. Natural gas and electric power utilities are particularly 
critical for the safety of the population in the case of a fault. Two interesting cases are 
reported in the references (Casal et al., 1995) and (National Transportation Safety Board, 
2001a). 
This paper describes an accident that occurred in Turin (Italy), in which power distribution 
cables,  tramway network feeding cables and a gas pipe were involved. 
The described accident is particularly interesting because it occurred in the town centre, at 
the crossroads between two crowded streets, lasted several hours (nearly 14 hours from 
when the first reports were made to the power distribution company until the fire was 
quenched) and produced a very high risk for the population. Fortunately no one was 
injured, but the effects could have been much worse. 
The relevance of the age of the distribution networks and the consequence of 
maintenance operations on the development of faults emerges from an analysis of the 
accident here reported. 
The domino effect, which from a small electric fault led to the natural gas explosion and 
fire, is also interesting. 
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2. The accident  
On March 5, 2006 an explosion occurred and a natural gas fire started in a street in the 
center of Turin. Fortunately, no one was injured, however the damage to the installations 
was severe and 120 people living in the nearest buildings were evacuated for 24 hours. 
At 13:48 of 5/3/06, a telephone call informed the fire brigade that a blackout had occurred 
and a small fire had begun in the basement of a building. The fire brigade arrived at the 
scene and found that there had been a short-circuit on a low voltage line. They also found 
a natural gas leak at the crossroads nearby. 
More or less at the same time (13:58), the electrical company was informed of a blackout 
in the same building; the workers found that a circuit breaker had opened the low voltage 
line because of a fault. 
Because of the persistent strong smell of gas, the electric company, following the 
directions of the fire brigade, switched off all the electric lines in the area. The buildings 
around the crossroads were evacuated (almost 120 people). 
At 14:30, the gas company began working to find and stop the gas leak. At 19:00, the 
explosive atmosphere accumulated in the underground facilities ignited and exploded 
blowing out some manhole covers; a fire started. 
Only at 3:30 the following day was the gas pipe interrupted and the fire put out. 
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Fig. 1 – Depth survey 
 
3. Description of the utilities 
There were many buried utilities below the road where the accident took place; from the 
ground surface and going downwards (for a detailed depth survey see Fig. 1) there were: 
traffic lights, tram points, public lighting, power distribution and tram network power cables, 
gas pipes and water pipes. The layout of the lower installations is described in Fig. 3. 
After the accident, the situation was left until the month of June, when a trench was 
opened to conduct the final repairs and, while working, it was possible to examine the 
utilities. 
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Fig. 2 – Gas pipe damage 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 – Lower buried facilities 
 
Two damaged points, marked “A” and “B” in Fig. 2, were found along the gas pipe: 
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 damage point “B” was found at the junction between the steel pipe used to cross 
the road and the older cast iron pipe (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5); 
 damage point “A” was found where tram cable n.7 crossed the steel gas pipe (see 
Fig. 6). 
While digging the trench where damage “A” occurred (see Fig. 8), it was found that tram 
cables 1-6 were fused together with the soil, and formed a vitrified mass (n. 6 in Fig. 8). 
The fused cable ends were also visible (n. 3 in Fig. 8). 
The following can be seen in the same picture: 
 the gas pipe (n. 1, 2); 
 the gas pipe sheath (n. 4); 
 the damaged point “A” (n.5). 
 
Gas pipe 
The damaged gas pipe (a steel pipe, DN 200) is part of the low pressure distribution 
network, which is a close-mesh network, and it is therefore not possible to interrupt the gas 
flow to a damaged section by operating valves. In the case of gas leak, the gas company 
has to section the damaged pipe on both sides of the fault by boring the pipe itself and 
inserting rubber balloons, that are then inflated (these operations were carried out in the 
points marked with the letters “C”, “D” and “E” in Fig. 2). For these reasons, a great deal of 
time was required to stop the gas leak. 
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Fig. 4 – Gas pipe damage “B” Fig. 5 – Gas pipe damage “B” 
 
Fig. 6 – Gas pipe damage “A” Fig. 7 – Water pipe damage 
 
Tram cables 
Electric cables 1-7 belong to the power distribution system of the tram network. They are 
fed at 600 V DC from a MV/LV substation through a double secondary transformer and an 
AC/DC converter and are connected to the overhead wiring to supply power to the 
vehicles. These cables are protected against overcurrents by extra-rapid circuit breakers 
that are set to trip for currents above 3000÷5000 A. Such high setting currents are required 
by modern tram vehicles but, unfortunately, in the case of a ground fault far from the 
substation, the fault current is often smaller than the setting of the circuit breaker and is 
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therefore interpreted as a normal operation current (Tommasini et al., 2006). This certainly 
happened the day of the accident and the fault was then allowed to continue for a long 
time, producing a large amount of heat and extensive damage to the other facilities. 
Cables 1-6 were made with EPR insulation and PVC sheath, with a cross-section of 1000 
mm2 and were protected by a PVC pipe. Cable 7 was an armoured cable, with a paper-oil 
insulation, a lead sheath, a PVC jacket, jute and bitumen and an outer mechanical shield 
of galvanized steel tape; its cross-section was 500 mm2 and it was protected by a gres 
pipe. 
The gres protection, however, was not found in the zone in which cable 7 crossed the gas 
and water pipes. It had probably been broken or removed during previous maintenance 
works. 
The damaged terminals of the cables are shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. 
 
 
Fig. 8 - Trench 
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Power distribution system 
The traffic lights and public lighting cables damaged at the site of the accident were fed by 
the power distribution network. The neutral conductors are never disconnected in this 
network and constitute a meshed grid. This explains how an overvoltage may have 
reached the electrical installations in the building near the crossroads. These installations 
were fed by a different line, which was not involved in the accident. 
The short-circuit occurred in an old and probably already weakened line, at the same time 
as the main events. This was not coincidental, but due to an overvoltage transfer from the 
damaged tram cables to the weakened line by the neutral conductors. 
 
Water pipe 
The water pipe, which crossed the other facilities at a greater depth, was made of cast iron 
and was damaged by an electric arc on a joint, where cable 7 crossed it (see Fig. 7). This 
pipe was not totally perforated, probably thanks to the cooling effect provided by the water 
flowing inside. 
 
 
Fig. 9 – Cable 7 Fig. 10 – Cable 1 
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4. Analysis of the accident 
Main accident 
No trace of the gres pipe which protected tram cable n. 7 was found near the gas pipe. 
This was probably damaged and removed during previous works (perhaps when the old 
cast iron gas pipe was substituted by the steel pipe in 1980). Moreover, the space 
between the gas pipe, the water pipe and the tram cables 1-6 was not sufficient to allow 
the gres pipe to cross (see Fig. 1 for details). 
For the above mentioned reasons, tram cable n. 7 crossed the gas pipe and the water pipe 
without any protection and was almost in contact with them. 
During the inspections after the accident, a water leak was found, at about 100 m from the 
crossroads where the accident happened; the water leak was caused by an old damaged 
lead pipe in the manhole marked with the letter “F” in Fig. 2. The street is slightly sloping, 
and the water therefore flowed through the PVC pipes of cables 1-6 and reached the 
accident area, where the terrain was flooded. This water flow accelerated the damage of 
cable 7, which started to leak current to the ground, through the gas and water pipes. In a 
vicious circle, the fault current produced heat, the heat accelerated the cable damage and 
the fault current increased. 
The fault current was not detected by the circuit breakers and was allowed to last for a 
long time. The ground fault current is actually lower than the circuit breakers setting at the 
site of the fault. 
The heat produced by the fault current and by the electric arcs damaged the gas and 
water pipes, fused the soil and also extended the fault damage to cables 1-6. 
Moreover, the current flowing through the gas pipe also caused damage (due to corrosion 
and/or arcing) to the junction between the cast iron pipe and the steel pipe. 
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The damages to the gas and water pipes where GTT cable 7 was crossing are certainly 
not due to corrosion but to the high current flow because it was directed from the cable into 
the pipes. The path followed by the fault current is shown in Fig. 11, where: 
A is the cast iron gas pipe; 
B is the steel gas pipe; 
C is GTT cable n. 7; 
D is the gas pipe damage (letter A in Fig. 2); 
E is the junction washer; 
F is the gas pipe damage (letter B in Fig. 2); 
G is the junction between the cast iron and the steel gas pipe; 
H is the junction metal ring. 
V = +600V
C
B
A
D
E F
G
H
 
Fig. 11 – Path followed by the electric current 
 
Underground temperature 
An analysis of the cables, pipes and vitrified soil made it possible to determine the 
temperature reached below the road during the event. The melting point of copper is 
1084°C, while the melting point of cast iron depends on its composition, but is around 
1200°C; during the accident the electric cables melted but the pipes did not: the 
temperature reached in the natural crucible which formed under the road was therefore in 
the range of between 1100 and 1200 °C. At this temperature, the vitreous mass was 
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sufficiently fluid to be a good electric conductor (glass viscosity and resistivity in fact 
decrease with similiar exponential laws with increasing temperature). 
 
Short circuits in the building nearby 
The short circuits were only a minor consequence of the previously described main events. 
The discharge between the electric line and its bearings was certainly due to an 
overvoltage; this discharge caused the circuit breaker to open the line and the small fire 
break out in the basement. 
The line feeding the building, however, was not buried very close to the accident location. 
As previously mentioned, the neutral conductors in the power distribution system are never 
disconnected and the overvoltage was therefore transferred to the line by either the traffic 
lights or public lighting cables neutral conductors. 
Nevertheless, a 600 V overvoltage is not sufficient to produce a discharge in a low voltage 
cable. The cable insulation was probably already weakened where the discharge occurred 
and this explains why the short circuits happened  on one cable only (which also was quite 
old). 
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Fig. 12 – ISD presenting the domino effects and the failure of the protection systems 
 
Domino effect 
It is interesting to notice the domino effect which, from a small electric fault and despite the 
many protection levels, led to the natural gas explosion and fire. Actually, starting from a 
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modest event (600 V electric cable loss of insulation), which most likely lasted for months, 
the aforementioned accident was reached in a crescendo of domino effects. This 
sequence has been represented by an Incidental Sequences Diagram (ISD) (Fig. 12) in 
which the failure of the different protection systems is highlighted (Piccinini and 
Ciarambino, 1997). These protection systems were mostly based upon the strict respect of 
procedures both in the installation and in the following maintenance of the different utilities. 
In general the development of an accident or any undesired event (Top Event) can be 
ascribed to a process malfunction AND to the failure of both the automatic and manual 
protection systems; these may be due to different initiating events OR human errors of 
different kind. The representation of Fig. 12, which is called Incidental Sequences Diagram 
(ISD), is a causes/consequences logical graph similar to the better known Fault Tree 
representation. The construction of these graphs proceeds downwards with small logic 
steps from the Top Events to the Initiating Events, while their reading, or their numerical 
solution, proceeds in the opposite way: upward from the Primary Events towards the Top 
Event. 
In the described approach, besides the AND logic gates, also the INH (Inhibit) gate has 
been used. This gate is specifically dedicated to draw attention to the protection systems: 
the input event of the inhibit gate becomes a more severe output if the protection system is 
already out of order when called to intervene and therefore does not block the 
phenomenon evolution (Demichela et al., 2004). 
 
 
5. Regulations regarding buried utilities clearance distances 
The previously described accident was particularly severe because the fault that affected 
the electric cables also involved the gas pipe, and this happened because of the short 
distance and lack of protection between the two buried utilities. 
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A review of international and Italian regulations regarding spacing between buried electric 
cables and gas pipes is given in this section. This problem has recently been examined in 
other papers (Azcarraga and Garcia-Colon, 2004), (Parker and Ward, 2003). 
In Italy, natural gas pipelines are subjected to the Ministerial Decree 24/11/84 (Ministry of 
Home Affairs, 1984). This law sets some general requirements about burial depths and 
distances from tram lines. 
For pipelines with a pressure of up to 0,5 bar (the standard urban gas distribution networks 
are below this pressure value), this decree does not require minimum distances from other 
buried pipes or cables. The only requirement is that the distance should be sufficient to 
allow maintenance to both buried utilities. 
 
Together with this decree, UNI-CIG1 and CEI1 standards are also applicable to this 
subject; they have legal bearing thanks to law 1083 of 1971 and law 186 of 1968. 
CEI Standard 11-17 gives instructions on the protection of cables against stray currents 
and on the coexistence of power cables with other cables, buried metallic pipes or tanks, 
gas pipelines, railways, tram networks, etc. (CEI, 2006). This standard, however, does not 
apply to cables that are part of electric traction systems. The requirements of this standard 
are: 
 for crossings between cables and pipes, the crossing itself should not be over or 
below unwelded pipe joints; power cables should not have splices closer than 1 m 
from the crossing point. The minimum distance should be 50 cm, but may be 
reduced to 30 cm if one of the facilities has a non metallic protection; 
 parallel pipes and cables should be buried at the maximum possible horizontal 
distance, which should not be less than 30 cm. A smaller horizontal distance is 
                                                 
1 See the Acronyms section 
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admitted only if the vertical distance is greater than 50 cm or non metallic 
protections are used; 
 where cables cross railways, tramways, etc. they should be protected by robust 
pipes or tunnels, at a depth of no less than 1 m. 
 
European Standard CEI EN 50122-2, which deals with protection against stray currents 
caused by DC traction systems, establishes that pipes and cables should be buried at a 
minimum distance of 1 m from traction systems (CEI, 1999). 
A new set of Standards, CEI UNI 70029 and CEI UNI 70030 (according to the Italian 
Directive of 3 March 1999) , sets the basic requirements for the installation of buried 
facilities in new or completely renewed urban areas (CEI-UNI, 1998a), (CEI-UNI, 1998b), 
(Ministry of Public Works, 1999). 
 
Italian Standard UNI 9165 does not specify a minimum distance for pipelines with a 
maximum operating pressure of up to 0,5 bar (in accordance with  D.M. 24/11/84). A 
minimum distance of 1 m is only set for polyethylene pipes and for the separation from 
tramways (minimum horizontal distance 0,5 m and minimum vertical distance in the case 
of crossings of 1 m; 0,5 m if in a protection sheath)(UNI, 2004). 
 
European Standard EN 12007-1 establishes that the pipeline operator should work to a set 
of minimum clearance distances for both parallel and crossing plants and sets guidelines 
for protective measures which should be taken in the case where lower clearance 
distances are required (CEN, 2000). 
 
Some regulations regarding spacing between buried gas pipes and electrical services in 
force abroad are listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1 – Regulations regarding spacing between buried gas pipes and electrical services in force abroad 
Country Document Requirements Ref. 
Australia AS/NZS 5601 
Separation of 100 mm if the electrical 
conduit or cable is mechanically 
protected; otherwise 300 mm 
(Office of the Chief 
Electrical Inspector, 
2003) and (Standards 
Australia, 2004) 
USA 
Washington 
Puget Sound 
Energy 
12’’ (30 cm) 
(Puget Sound Energy, 
2006) 
USA 
Washington Gas 
Light Company 
12’’ (30 cm) 
(National Transportation 
Safety Board, 2001b) 
USA 
Colorado 
San Miguel Power 
Association 
36’’ (91 cm) 
(San Miguel Power 
Association, 2006) 
Canada SaskPower 60 cm (SaskPower, 2004) 
 
6. Discussion 
The accident was caused by the fact that many cables and pipes were buried at a limited 
distance from each other, without any proper protection. With reference to Fig. 12, the 
electric fault, involving tram cable n. 7, a water pipe and a gas pipe occurred because: 
 the gres protection pipe was not present where the power cable crossed the two 
pipes; 
 the distance between the two pipes and the cable was nearly null; 
 the tram cable was quite old (installed in 1956). 
The gres protection pipe was missing because it had probably been damaged during 
previous works. The problem of damage to buried utilities during maintenance works not 
involving the utilities themselves is rather common; although standards and guidelines 
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exist that provide operative rules, they do not seem to be respected (Work Safe BC, 2005), 
(UNI, 1996). 
Electric cables have a life of approximately 40 years; moreover, paper-oil insulated cables 
suffer from the “draining effect”, in particular with high and strongly changing loads 
(Pultrum et al., 1998). Tram cable n. 7 was 50 years old when the accident occurred and 
tram networks typically have high and strongly changing loads. The substitution of electric 
cables after a certain number of years is not a common practice: only insulation tests are 
performed periodically (cable 7 was tested in June 2004). 
The electric fault was not detected by the cable protections; this situation is common 
because, in traction systems, at the fault location the ground fault current is often lower 
than the setting of the circuit breakers. With the old circuit breaker models, the only 
settings were current values; in the new substations that feed the tram network, new circuit 
breakers are being installed, with more sophisticated relays. These relays also allow 
current derivative analysis to be made to distinguish between a fault and a normal 
operation current. 
Actually, starting from a modest event (600 V electric cable loss of insulation), which most 
likely lasted for months, the accident was reached in a crescendo of domino effects. This 
sequence has been represented by an ISD in which the failure of the different protection 
systems is highlighted. These protection systems were mostly based upon the strict 
respect of procedures both in the installation and in the following maintenance of the 
different utilities. 
 
Conclusions 
The importance of the age of the distribution networks and the consequence of 
maintenance operations in the developing of faults emerged from the analysis of the 
accident here reported. 
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A periodical check of the cables insulation is probably not sufficient, and after a certain 
number of years (mean life) they should be substituted. 
Accidents like the one described in this paper are not unusual; moreover, occurring in 
towns, where population densities are high, they produce a very high risk to the 
population. For this reason, a certain standardization of the rules regarding clearance 
distances between different buried utilities, and in particular between gas pipes and 
electric power cables, is desirable. In particular in Italy the introduction of a minimum 
clearance distance also for gas pipes with operating pressure up to 0,5 bar would be 
useful. 
Fortunately, modern relays are being installed in Turin to improve fault detection in the 
tramway feeding network; this kind of relay should be installed in all traction systems. 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank C. Barbera (VVF), A. Marsigli and G. Dimilta (AES), T. 
Barbarino and Di Iulio (GTT) and M. Machetta (AEM) for their support in the accident 
analysis during the repairs to the utilities. 
 
Acronyms 
AC Alternated Current 
AEM Azienda Energetica Metropolitana (Turin Power Distribution Company) 
AES Azienda Energia e Servizi (Turin Gas Company) 
AS Australian Standard 
CEI Comitato Elettrotecnico Italiano (Italian Electrotechnical Committee) 
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CIG Comitato Italiano Gas (Italian Gas Committee) 
DC Direct Current 
DM Decreto Ministeriale (Ministry Decree) 
DN Nominal Diameter 
EN European Norm 
EPR Ethylene Propylene Rubber 
FT Fault Tree 
GTT Gruppo Torinese Trasporti (Turin Tramway Network Company) 
ISD Incidental Sequences Diagram 
LV Low Voltage 
MV Medium Voltage 
NG Natural Gas 
NZS New Zealand Standard 
PVC Polyvinyl Chloride 
TE Top Event 
UNI Ente Nazionale Italiano di Unificazione (Italian National Unification Organization) 
VVF Vigili del Fuoco (Fire Brigade) 
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